Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds by Matthew O. Jackson & Benjamin Golub
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 




Naïve Learning in Social Networks: 
Convergence, Influence and 
Wisdom of Crowds 
Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson 
 


















Benjamin Golub, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena  








Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and 
Wisdom of Crowds 
 
Summary 
We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an 
arbitrary social network and naïvely update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted 
averages of their neighbors’ opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of 
all agents in large societies converge to the truth, despite their naïve updating. We show 
that this happens if and only if the influence of the most influential agent in the society 
is vanishing as the society grows. Using simple examples, we identify two main 
obstructions which can prevent this. By ruling out these obstructions, we provide 
general structural conditions on the social network that are sufficient for convergence to 
truth. In addition, we show how social influence changes when some agents redistribute 
their trust, and we provide a complete characterization of the social networks for which 
there is a convergence of beliefs. Finally, we survey some recent structural results on 
the speed of convergence and relate these to issues of segregation, polarization and 
propaganda. 
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Social networks are primary conduits of information, opinions, and behaviors. They carry
news about products, jobs, and various social programs; inﬂuence decisions to become ed-
ucated, to smoke, and to commit crimes; and drive political opinions and attitudes toward
other groups, just to mention a few of their eﬀects. In view of this, it is important to under-
stand how beliefs and behaviors evolve over time, how this depends on the network structure,
and whether or not the resulting outcomes are fully eﬃcient.
Given the complex forms that social networks often take, it can be diﬃcult for the
agents involved, or for a modeler, to update beliefs properly based on communication in a
network. For example, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2007; 2005) ﬁnd that although subjects in
simple three-person networks update fairly well in some circumstances, they do not do so
well in evaluating repeated observations and judging indirect information whose origin is
uncertain. Given that our social networks involve repeated transfers of information among
large numbers of individuals, fully rational learning becomes infeasible at best. Nonetheless,
it can still be that fairly simple updating rules can lead to eventual outcomes like those
achieved through fully rational learning. In this paper we examine these questions with
respect to a variation of a model of network inﬂuence that has its roots in measures of
centrality and prestige developed by Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987), and which is also
also related to models of social inﬂuence and persuasion by French (1956), Harary (1959),
and Friedkin and Johnsen (1997). More recently, a variation on this model has been analyzed
as a model of information transmission and opinion formation by DeMarzo, Vayanos and
Zwiebel (2003).
In the variation of the model that we analyze, agents update their beliefs or attitudes in
each period simply by taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions from the previous
period, possibly placing some weight on their own previous beliefs. While the agents in this
scenario are boundedly rational, failing to adjust correctly for repetitions and dependencies
in information that they hear multiple times,1 we show that this process can still lead them
to fully accurate beliefs in the limit as society grows large. Moreover, the limiting properties
of this process are not only useful as a model of belief evolution, but also as a basis for
analyzing the inﬂuence or power of the diﬀerent individuals comprising a network.2
Our contributions are outlined as follows, in the order in which they appear in the paper.
1See Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) and DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) for more background dis-
cussion on this type of bounded rationality.
2For instance, it can also be viewed as a myopic best-response dynamic for a game where agents care
about matching the behavior of those in their social network (possibly placing some weight on themselves).
1First, much of the previous literature has worked under an assumption that at least
some agents always place some weight on their own opinions when updating. This is often
for convenience, as that assumption guarantees convergence of beliefs by appealing to some
standard results on Markov chains. While we might expect this to be true for some agents in
some situations, there are clearly many applications where agents start without information
or believe that others may be better informed and thus defer to the opinions of others.
This turns out to be important in determining whether or not beliefs converge. Our ﬁrst
contribution is to provide a complete characterization of convergence. That is, we identify
the conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient for convergence of an iteration of an arbitrary
stochastic matrix. This characterization applies not only to the belief-updating application
of this paper, but also to the stability of other measures of centrality and other Markov chain
applications. While the basic idea of the condition is known in the Markov chain literature,
we have not seen it stated in the form we give, which is particularly relevant in the social
network context. When beliefs do converge, they converge to a certain weighted average of
agents’ initial beliefs, and the weights correspond naturally to a measure of social inﬂuence
or importance.
In the second section, which contains the main novel theoretical results of the paper, we
study when a large society of na¨ ıve updaters will actually converge so that all individuals
learn the true state of nature, assuming they all start with diﬀerent noisy signals about
this state. There is a diﬀerence between having all agents converge to the same belief
and having all agents converge to the correct belief. If the limiting belief tends to the
correct belief as a society grows large, we call the society wise. The section contains a
complete characterization of wisdom in terms of inﬂuence weights: a society is wise if and
only if the inﬂuence of the most inﬂuential agent is vanishing as the society grows. Building
on this characterization, we then focus on the relationship between social structure and
wisdom. Using simple examples, we identify two main obstructions that can prevent a
society from being wise. One of them is the existence of extreme imbalances in trust, with
some groups getting a very disproportionate share of attention. The other main obstruction
is a lack of dispersion: when small groups do not pay suﬃcient attention to the rest of
the world. Examples illustrate that either problem, even in the absence of the other, can
prevent wisdom. With this in mind, we can formulate general structural conditions which
rule out these obstructions. The ﬁrst type of condition requires a minimal amount of balance,
and the second type of condition requires a minimal degree of dispersion. Assuming that
precise versions of these conditions hold, we prove that as a society grows, its limiting beliefs
become arbitrarily accurate. That is, they correctly aggregate the information that might
2initially be dispersed throughout the network. These results are in contrast with Theorem
2 of DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003), which says that consensus beliefs (for a ﬁxed
population of n agents) are correct only if a knife-edge restriction on the weights holds. More
generally, our conclusions diﬀer from a long line of previous work which suggests that the
suﬃcient conditions for na¨ ıve learning to happen are very strong.3 We show that beliefs can
be correct in the large-society limit for a fairly broad collection of networks.
Third, we apply the model to study the eﬀects of changes in the weights agents give
to their neighbors’ beliefs. We give a simple matrix calculation which can always be used
to determine how social inﬂuence changes when some agents redistribute their trust. We
obtain two interpretable corollaries by considering speciﬁc perturbations, showing that an
agent’s social inﬂuence weakly increases when some agents listen to him more at the expense
of others. Moreover, we show quite generally that the impact of a redistribution of trust
on others’ social inﬂuences is directly proportional to the inﬂuence of the agent doing the
redistributing. In the process, we derive some simple and implementable summation formulas
for computing perturbations of the limiting distribution of strongly connected Markov chains,
and ﬁnd the signs of these perturbations. To our knowledge, these mathematical results have
not appeared elsewhere and extend the theory of Markov processes.
Finally, we survey several recent and useful results on the dynamics of the updating pro-
cess studied here. In particular, for situations where there is convergence, we give explicit
upper and lower bounds on the rate of convergence using standard results related to the
second largest eigenvalue of the matrix of network interactions. We then describe how a
theorem on Markov chains by Hartﬁel and Meyer (1998) can be used to relate second eigen-
values to the structure of society. Building on this, we can deduce that convergence is “slow”
if society is divided into several mutually distrustful factions. We also study some results on
fast convergence, and ﬁnally discuss how these conclusions provide a quantitative explana-
tion for some forms of polarization and propaganda. Most of the material in this section is
drawn from recent mathematical results throughout the Markov chain and computer science
literatures. As these have not previously been collected and discussed in relation to models
of information transmission or social centrality, our contribution in this part is primarily
expository.
Our work relates to several lines of research other than the ones already discussed. There
is a large theoretical literature on social learning, both fully and boundedly rational, and
a number of studies investigating learning in the context of social networks. Similarly to
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993; 1995), we examine updating that is somewhat myopic. This
3See Sobel (2000) for a comprehensive survey.
3is also in the spirit of Bala and Goyal (1998; 2001) in allowing arbitrarily complex network
structures.
In many of these and other social learning models (e.g., Banerjee (1992), Gale and Kariv
(2003), Celen and Kariv (2004), and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)), agents converge to
holding the same belief or at least the same judgment as to an optimal action. These
conclusions often rely on observational learning, so that agents are observing choices or
payoﬀs over time and updating accordingly.4 Our results are quite diﬀerent from these. In
contrast to the observational learning models, convergence and the eﬃciency of learning in
our model depend critically on the details of the network architecture and on the inﬂuence
of various agents.
In addition to the study by DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) that we have already
discussed, there is work by Collignon and Al-Sadoon (2006) the examines a similar model.
They concentrate on when it is that each individual exerts some inﬂuence in a society, so their
focus diﬀers from ours. The closest point of overlap is that they present some simulations
related to rates of convergence, an issue which we discuss from a theoretical perspective in
Section 6.
In sociology, since the work of Katz (1953), French (1956), and Bonacich (1987), eigenvector-
like notions of centrality and prestige have been analyzed.5 As some such models are based
on convergence of iterated inﬂuence relationships, our results provide foundations for under-
standing when convergence is obtained.
Finally, there is an enormous empirical literature about the inﬂuence of social acquain-
tances on behavior and outcomes that we will not attempt to survey here, but simply point
out that our model provides testable predictions about the relationships between social
structure and social learning.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents and Interaction
A ﬁnite set A = {1,2,...,n} of agents interact according to a social network. The agents
are the nodes of a directed graph. The interaction patterns are captured through an n × n
nonnegative matrix T. The matrix T may be directed so that Tij > 0 while Tji = 0. We
refer to T as the interaction matrix.
4For a general version of the observational learning approach, see Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2006).
5See also Wasserman and Faust (1994), Bonacich and Lloyd (2001) and Jackson (2007) for more recent
elaborations.
4In what follows, we examine the case where T is a stochastic matrix, so that it its entries
across each row sum to one – so the assumption amounts to a normalization. As discussed
below, this type of matrix is particularly relevant in a situation where agents are updating
beliefs by taking weighted averages; the entry Tij is the weight or trust that agent i places
on the current belief of agent j in forming his or her belief for the next period.
2.2 Updating Processes
Let us discuss the application of this framework to belief updating. DeMarzo, Vayanos and
Zwiebel (2003) examine a model where the agents in the network are trying to estimate some
unknown parameter µ. The belief held by agent i at time t is pi(t), and the vector of beliefs
at time t is written p(t). The updating rule is:
p(t) =
h
(1 − λt)I + λtb T
i
p(t − 1)
where λt ∈ (0,1] and b T is a stochastic matrix. In the case where λt is constant over time,
this can be written as
p(t) = Tp(t − 1) = T
tp(0), (1)
where T has strictly positive diagonal entries.6 This will be the updating rule studied in this
paper, though in the ensuing analysis, we will drop the assumption on the diagonal entries
of T.
The evolution of beliefs can be motivated by the following Bayesian setup discussed by
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003). At the beginning of the evolution, t = 0, each
agent receives a noisy signal pi(0) = µ + ei where ei ∈ R is a noise term with expectation
zero. Agent i hears the opinions of the agents with whom he interacts, and assigns precision
πij to each one of them. These subjective estimates may, but need not, coincide with the
true precisions of their signals. If agent i does not listen to agent j, he gives him precision
πij = 0. In the case where the signals are normal, Bayesian updating from independent
signals at t = 1 entails the rule (1) with Tij = πij/
Pn
k=1 πik.
The key behavioral assumption is that the agents continue using this rule throughout the
evolution. That is, they do not adjust the precision estimates or account for the possible
6DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) examine the case in which pi(t) is a vector instead of a scalar, to
permit the analysis of multidimensional opinions. Then each agent has a vector of beliefs, not just a single
estimate. The main conclusion of the study is that all the components of such a belief vector, in the long
run, behave in essentially the same way. As the focus of our analysis is diﬀerent, it is suﬃcient to consider
a single dimension and the extension to many dimensions is direct.
5repetition of information and for the “cross-contamination” of their neighbors’ signals. This
bounded rationality arising from persuasion bias is discussed at length by DeMarzo, Vayanos
and Zwiebel (2003), and so we do not reiterate that here.
Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) examine a related model where social attitudes depend on
the attitudes of neighbors and evolve over time. Let p(0) ∈ Rn
+ be a vector indicating
agents’ beliefs or attitudes. Let D be an n × n matrix where entries are only positive along
the diagonal, and Dii ∈ (0,1) indicates the extent to which agent i pays attention to others’
attitudes. The evolution is described by
p(t) = DTp(t − 1) + (I − D)p(0)
So, agents start with attitudes p(0) and then mix in some of their neighbors’ recent attitudes






i (I − D)p(0),
and so the behavior of p(t) depends on the powers of DT. Thus, to understand the behavior
of p(t) over time it is important to understand the properties of (DT)t, which are the object
of study in this paper.
It is important to note that other applications also have the same form as that here. For
instance, Google’s “PageRank” system is analagous to the inﬂuence vectors from Theorem
3 below, where the T matrix is the normalized link matrix.7 This corresponds to deﬁning
the inﬂuence of node i as the limit of Tt times a unit vector p(0) where the 1 is placed in
the i-th entry and other entries are set to 0. Other citation and inﬂuence measures also have
similar such eigenvector bases (e.g., see Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004)).8
2.3 Walks, Paths and Cycles
The following are standard graph-theoretic deﬁnitions applied to the directed graph of con-
nections induced by the interaction matrix T.
A walk in T is a sequence of nodes B = i1,i2,...,iK, not necessarily distinct, such that
7So Tij = 1/`i if page i has a link to page j, where `i is the number of links that page i has to other
pages.
8We also see iterative interaction matrices in of recursive utility (e.g., Rogers (2006)) and in strategic
games played by agents on networks where inﬂuence measures turn out to be important (e.g., Ballester,
Calv` o-Armengol and Zenou (2006)). In such applications understanding the properties of Tt and related
matrices is critical.
6Tikik+1 > 0 for each k ∈ {1,...,K − 1}. We write i ∈ B for a node i and walk B if i is a
node in the sequence B, and we say that a walk B = i1,i2,...,iK goes from i1 to iK. The
length of the walk is deﬁned to be K − 1.
A path in T is a walk consisting of distinct nodes.
A cycle is a walk i1,i2,...,iK such that i1 = iK. The length of the cycle is deﬁned to
be K − 1. A cycle is simple if the only node appearing twice in the sequence is the starting
(ending) node.
The matrix T is strongly connected if there is path relative to T from any node to any
other node. Similarly, we say that A0 ⊂ A is strongly connected if T restricted to A0 is. This
is true if and only if the nodes in A0 all lie on a cycle involves only them.
A group of nodes A0 ⊂ A is closed relative to T if i ∈ A0 and Tij > 0 implies that j ∈ A0.
A closed group of nodes A0 ⊂ A is minimal relative to T if no nonempty strict subset is
closed.
Observe that any minimal closed group is strongly connected.
3 Convergence of Beliefs Under Na¨ ıve Updating
3.1 Deﬁnitions and Examples
Consider an arbitrary matrix iteration process characterized by an updating rule of the form
p(t) = Tp(t − 1) = T
tp(0),
where T is a row-stochastic matrix. We now provide a full characterization of the interaction
matrices for which there is convergence in the sense that limt→∞ Ttp exists for all vectors
p. We will specialize to the language of the belief-updating model discussed in Section 2.2,
but the mathematical result applies equally well in other settings.
Definition. A matrix T is convergent if limt→∞ Ttp exists for all vectors p.
A condition ensuring convergence in strongly connected matrices is aperiodicity.
Definition. The matrix T is aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of the lengths of its
simple cycles is 1.
It is well-known that if T is strongly connected (also referred to as being irreducible) and
aperiodic, then it is convergent (e.g., see Meyer (2000)). In fact, studies of social networks
7involving convergence of a matrix generally assume that T is strongly connected and that
Tii > 0 for some or all i, which implies that the matrix is aperiodic.














T if t is odd
I if t is even.
In particular, if p1(0) 6= p2(0), then the belief vector never reaches a steady state; the two
agents keep switching beliefs.





































then T is periodic as all of its cycles are of even lengths and T is no longer convergent.
3.2 A Characterization of Convergence
As mentioned before, it is well-known that aperiodicity is suﬃcient for convergence in the
case where where T is strongly connected. The following theorem shows that, in this case,
aperiodicity is also a necessary condition for convergence. We give a simple constructive
8proof that for a given strongly connected matrix which is not aperiodic, there is an unstable
initial vector p. The idea of this result is standard in the Markov chain literature,9 but since
the graph induced by T is a less important object in most Markov chain models than it is
here, we have not seen the fact stated in terms of simple cycles, as it is here. This result is
then quite useful in developing our full characterization of convergence when we also consider
T’s that are not strongly connected.
Theorem 1. If a stochastic matrix T is strongly connected, then it is convergent if and only
if it is aperiodic.
While strongly connected interaction matrices occur in some settings, most social inter-
actions will not involve strong connection. Thus, it is important to have a more general
characterization. We now use the above fact to give a complete characterization of conver-
gence.
Definition. The matrix T is strongly aperiodic if it is aperiodic when restricted to any
closed group of nodes.
Theorem 2. A stochastic matrix T is convergent if and only if it is strongly aperiodic.
Theorem 2 is not a simple extension of Theorem 1. The main issue is the following. We
can think of decomposing a society into minimal closed groups (i.e. maximal groups that
are strongly connected) and then the set of remaining agents. We know from Theorem 1
that convergence holds when we restrict attention to the strongly connected agents under
aperiodicity. The challenge of the proof is to show that this is in fact all that is needed to
imply that the beliefs of all the other agents must also converge. Since all agents are path
connected to some agent in a minimal closed group, the proof boils down to showing that
an agent with some weight on a path that goes to an agent with convergent beliefs must
also have beliefs that converge. This relies on limiting properties of the interaction matrix,
which can be seen by rearranging it into a suitable block form.
We emphasize that Theorem 2 is useful beyond the application to beliefs, but also in
understanding centrality measures and a variety of other Markov chain applications.
3.3 Inﬂuence and the Limiting Beliefs
Beyond knowing whether or not beliefs converge, we are also interested in characterizing what
beliefs converge to when they do converge. The following is an easy extension of Theorem 10
9For example, see Kemeny and Snell (1960, p. 6–7 and p. 35–37).
9in DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003). They consider a case where T has positive entries
on the diagonal, but their proof is easily extended to the case with 0 entries on the diagonal.
We let M be the collection of minimal closed groups, and deﬁne M =
S
B∈M B. A subscript
B indicates projection (resp. restriction) of vectors (resp. operators) to the subspace of Rn
corresponding to the set of agents in B.
Theorem 3. A stochastic matrix T is convergent if and only if there is a nonnegative row
vector s ∈ Rn, and for each j / ∈ M a vector wj ≥ 0 with |M| entries that sum to 1 such that
1.
P
i∈B si = 1 for any minimal closed group B,
2. si = 0 if i is not in a minimal closed group,
3. sB is the left eigenvector of TB corresponding to the eigenvalue 1,
4. for any vector p and any minimal closed group B, (limt→∞ Tt
Bp)B = sBpB,





This result says that, when beliefs converge, all agents in any closed group will eventually
come arbitrarily close to holding the same belief. This belief will be a weighted average of
the initial beliefs of the agents in that group. The weights are the entries of the vector s,
and the weight of any agent in a closed group is positive. We refer to si the inﬂuence weight
or simply the inﬂuence of agent i. Agents who are not in M have no inﬂuence and their
beliefs converge to weighted sums of the beliefs of the agents whom they observe.
The most important thing to note about the vector s is that sj =
P
i∈A Tijsi for all j, so
that the inﬂuence of an agent is the sum of the inﬂuences of those who trust him, weighted
by their trust for him. This is a very natural property for a measure of inﬂuence to have:
inﬂuential people are those who are trusted by other inﬂuential people.
4 The Wisdom of Crowds: Convergence to Accurate
Beliefs in Large Societies
In this section, we examine sequences of convergent matrices (Tn)
∞
n=1 indexed by n, the num-
ber of agents in each. This may be viewed as a sequence of successive snapshots of a growing
network, as we add one agent at a time; or simply as a standard tool for understanding
what happens in “large” societies. We are interested in the conditions under which agents
communicating through the network converge to hold the “correct” belief.
10Throughout this section, we maintain the assumption that Tn is convergent for each n
without repeating it in every result.
4.1 Information and Examples of Unwise Societies
Suppose that the true state of nature is µ, and let each agent i in network n see a signal
φn
i that is distributed with mean µ, a ﬁnite variance of at least σ2 > 0, and support that
is a subset of a compact set [−M,M]. Suppose that signals are independently (but not
necessarily identically) distributed.
Let sn be the inﬂuence vector corresponding to Tn, as deﬁned in Theorem 3. We write
the (i,j) entry of Tn as T n
ij, and the belief of agent i at time t as pn
i (t). In each network,
order the agents so that sn
i ≥ sn




In each network of the sequence, the limiting belief of each agent i in network n approaches
some limit pn
i (∞). We say the sequence of networks is wise when, for each i, this belief
converges in probability to the true state µ as n → ∞.
Definition. The sequence (Tn)
∞





i (∞) = 0
for each i.
To get some feeling for which societies are wise, start by supposing, for a moment, that
the communication structure is a strongly complete graph – i.e., every possible link is present
and that all links have equal weight: i.e., T n
ij = 1/n for all i,j ∈ A. In this situation, it is
easy to see that sn
i = 1/n for each i ∈ A. Indeed, after the ﬁrst period every agent holds
the average belief of the society. By a law of large numbers, as n grows the beliefs become
arbitrarily accurate.
Obviously, this question becomes substantially more complicated when the communica-
tion structure has less symmetry. Diﬀerent agents can have diﬀerent inﬂuence weights, and
so certain signals will aﬀect the ﬁnal state more than others. Can the fundamental idea of the
above example can be carried through in more general networks? The answer is sometimes,
but not always, yes.
To get some idea of the challenge faced in discerning when a wise crowds result holds,
let us examine an example.
11Example 3. Consider the following network, deﬁned for arbitrary n. Fix δ,ε ∈ (0,1) and




    






1 − ε ε 0 ··· 0
1 − ε 0 ε ··· 0
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
1 − ε 0 0 ··· ε

 
   

.
The network is shown in Figure 1 for n = 6 agents.




Figure 1: The unbalanced star network (shown here for n = 6 agents), which is one example









1−ε+δ if i = 1
δ
(n−1)(1−ε+δ) if i > 1.
This network will not always converge to the truth. Observe that at stage n, the limiting
belief is sn
1φn
1 plus some other independent random variables that have mean µ. As sn
1 is
bounded away from 0, the variance of of the limiting belief remains bounded away from 0
for all n. So beliefs will not generally converge to truth. The intuition is simply that the
leader’s information – even when it is far from the mean – is weighted heavily enough that
it biases the ﬁnal belief, and the followers’ signals cannot do much to correct it. Indeed,
Proposition 1 below shows that as long as some agent’s inﬂuence is bounded away from 0
for all n, convergence to true beliefs will not generally occur.
12Note that even if we let 1 − ε approach 0 at any rate we like, so that people are not
weighting the center very much, the center has nonvanishing inﬂuence as long as δ is of
the same order as 1 − ε. Thus, it is not simply the total weight on a given indivdiual that
matters, but the relative weights that matter.
One thing that goes wrong in this example is that the central agent receives an high
amount of trust relative to the amount given back to others, making him unduly inﬂuential.
However, this is not the only obstruction to convergence to true beliefs. There are examples
in which the trust coming into any node is bounded relative to the trust going out, and there
is still an extremely inﬂuential agent who can keep society’s beliefs away from the true state.











Figure 2: The unbalanced line, which demonstrates that a network may not converge to
truth even if every agent’s incoming trust is bounded. Agents are numbered from left to
right.
Example 4. Fix δ ∈ (0,1/2) and deﬁne, for each n ≥ 1, an n-by-n interaction matrix by

        
        
T n
11 = 1 − δ
T n
i,i−1 = 1 − δ if i ∈ {2,...,n}
T n




ij = 0 otherwise.



















In particular, limn→∞ sn
1 can be made as close to 1 as desired by choosing a small δ. As
in the previous example, it can then be shown that the system will not generally converge
to true beliefs. The reason for the leader’s undue inﬂuence here is somewhat more subtle
13than in Example 3: it is not the trust he directly receives, but indirect trust accruing to him
due to his privileged position in the network. Thus, while he only receives twice as much
direct trust as the typical agent, his inﬂuence can exceed the sum of all other inﬂuences
by a huge factor for small δ. This shows that it can be extremely misleading to measure
agents’ inﬂuence based on direct incoming trust; instead, the entire structure of the network
is relevant.
4.2 Wisdom in Terms of Inﬂuence: A Law of Large Numbers
We now seek to investigate the question outlined above more generally. We ﬁrst develop a
variation on a standard law of large numbers that is helpful in our setting, as we are working
with weighted averages and potentially non-identically distributed random variables. The
following result will be used to completely characterize wisdom in terms of inﬂuence weights.
Lemma 1. If (Tn)∞










if and only if maxi sn
i → 0.10




i will converge to truth if and only if the most important agent’s inﬂuence tends
to 0. With slightly more careful analysis, this lemma implies an important result.
Proposition 1. If (Tn)∞





i (∞) = µ
for all i if and only if maxi sn
i → 0.
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that (Tn)
∞
n=1 is wise if and only if the inﬂuence of the most
important agent in the whole society tends to 0. This result is natural in view of the examples
in Section 4.1, where saw that a society can be led astray if the leader has too much inﬂuence.












= 0 for all r > 0.
144.3 Wisdom in Terms of Social Structure: Suﬃcient Conditions
The characterization found above is useful, but still quite abstract. It is interesting to ask
what is required, in more concrete terms, for wisdom. We now provide structural suﬃcient
conditions for a society to be wise. First, we note that when studying wisdom, we can choose
the most convenient power of the interaction matrices to work with – that is, we can study
direct inﬂuences or indirect inﬂuences at any level.
Proposition 2. If, for all n there exists kn such that Rn = Tkn
n , then (Tn)∞
n=1 is wise if
and only if (Rn)∞
n=1 is wise.
To show this, note that limt→∞ Tt
n = limt→∞ Rt
n, so that for every n, the inﬂuence vectors
will be the same for both matrices by an easy application of Theorem 3.
Our ﬁrst suﬃcient condition for wisdom is straightforward:
Proposition 3. If (Tn)∞
n=1 is a sequence of strongly connected,11 aperiodic, and row-
stochastic matrices such that each column sums to one, then it is wise.12
Proposition 3 follows directly from fact that if T is both row and column stochastic, and
strongly connected, then it has (left and right) unit eigenvectors of s = ( 1
n,..., 1
n), and so
then the inﬂuence of each agent in the society is equal. This makes clear how strong it is
to have each agent receiving the same total weight in such a social network. An obvious
suﬃcient condition for this is to have the matrix be symmetric, so that pairs of agents have
the same trust for each other.
We now consider other, less restrictive assumptions that generate the same conclusion.
Since wisdom is a notion deﬁned in the large society limit, we are led to consider asymptotic
properties of social groups. In what follows, (Bn)
∞
n=1 denotes a arbitrary sequence of sets
such that Bn ⊆ An for each n ∈ N. This type of sequence should be viewed as a subset of
society, possibly growing and changing as society grows.
Definition. The sequence (Bn)∞
n=1 of sets of nodes is small if limn→∞
|Bn|
n = 0.
Definition. The sequence (Bn)∞
n=1 of sets of nodes is ﬁnite if there is a k such that
supn |Bn| ≤ k.
11Instead of strong connectedness, it suﬃces for it to be possible to partition the agents into strongly
connected subsets that are growing in size plus some subsets that receive no trust from any of the strongly
connected ones.




Figure 3: The large arrows illustrate the concept of the weight of one group on another.
The conditions will be stated in terms of weight that certain groups have for other groups,






This is the weight of B on C, also called the trust of B for C. The concept is illustrated in
Figure 3.
The ﬁrst family of suﬃcient conditions for wise conditions is as follows.








The balance condition says that any group of agents who involves less than half of the
society cannot be getting inﬁnitely more trust from the remaining agents than they give
to the remaining agents. This rules out situations like Example 3 above. It also excludes
situations in which some group receives a bounded amount of trust but has vanishing trust
for the rest of the world.
Property 2 (Minimal Out-Dispersion). There is a q ∈ N and r > 0 such that if Bn is
ﬁnite, |Bn| ≥ q, and |Cn| ≥ n/2, then T n
Bn,Cn > r for all large enough n.
16The minimal out-dispersion condition requires that any large enough group must give at
least some minimal trust to groups that contain more than half of the agents. This rules out
situations like Example 4 above, in which there are agents that ignore the vast majority of
society.
Having stated these two conditions, we can give the ﬁrst main result on wise crowds,
which states that the conditions are suﬃcient for wisdom.
Theorem 4. If (Tn)∞
n=1 is a sequence of convergent stochastic matrices satisfying balance
and minimal out-dispersion, then it is wise.
Note, however, that neither condition is suﬃcient on its own. Example 4 satisﬁes the
ﬁrst property but not the second. The square of the matrix in Example 3 satisﬁes the second
but not the ﬁrst. In both examples the society fails to be wise. (This relies on an appeal to
Proposition 2 in the latter case.)
Theorem 4 suggests that there are two important ingredients in wisdom: a lack of extreme
imbalances in the trust structure and also a lack of local self-centered groups which pay very
little attention to the outside world. To explore this idea further, we formulate diﬀerent
conditions in the same spirit which also generate wisdom. The essential diﬀerence is that
the notion of dispersion now focuses on links coming into a certain type of group as opposed
to ones going out.
Property 3 (Balance for Small Groups). If (Bn)∞








This property weakens the balance condition to only hold for small groups.
Property 4 (Minimal In-Dispersion). There is a q ∈ N and an r < 1 such that if
|Bn| = q and Cn ⊆ An − Bn is ﬁnite then T n
Cn,Bn ≤ rT n
Bn,An−Bn for all large enough n.
This condition requires that the trust coming into a ﬁnite group not be too concentrated.
The ﬁnite group Bn cannot have a ﬁnite neighborhood which gives Bn as much trust, asymp-
totically, as Bn gives out. This essentially requires inﬂuential groups to have a broad base
of support, and rules out situations like Example 4 above. Indeed, along with Property 3, it
is enough to generate wisdom.
Theorem 5. If (Tn)∞
n=1 is a sequence of convergent stochastic matrices satisfying balance
for small groups and minimal in-dispersion, then it is wise.
17The proofs of Theorem 4 and 5 are technical, but the intuition behind them is not dif-
ﬁcult. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the wisdom conclusion does not hold. Then
there must be a group of agents that have positive inﬂuence as n → ∞, and a remaining un-
inﬂuential group. Since the sum of inﬂuences must add up to 1, having some very inﬂuential
agents requires having a great number of uninﬂuential agents. In particular, the inﬂuential
group must be fairly small. As a result, it can only give out a limited amount of trust, and
thus can only have a similarly limited amount of trust coming in, using one of the balance
conditions. Recall that the inﬂuence of an agent is a trust-weighted sum of the inﬂuences
of those who trust him. The contradiction comes from the fact that the uninﬂuential group
does not have enough inﬂuence to support the high inﬂuence of the inﬂuential group, since
it can give this group only a limited amount of trust. But neither can the inﬂuential group
get all its support from inside itself, because the minimal out- and in-dispersion conditions
require it to send some of its trust outside, or to get a nontrivial fraction of its support from
outside, respectively.
It turns out that this informal argument is challenging to convert to a formal one, because
the array of inﬂuence weights sn
i as n and i range over all possible values has some surprising
and diﬃcult properties. Nevertheless, the basic ideas outlined above can be carried through
successfully.
5 Comparative Statics: Changes in Trust
As we have seen, for a convergent system, the distribution of inﬂuence weights is an eigen-
vector of the interaction matrix. While this characterization is very handy mathematically,
it is still somewhat abstract and so we now provide comparative statics which illustrate the
relationship between local trust and global inﬂuence more concretely.
There are some very easy conclusions that we can reach based on the fact that sj =
P
i Tijsi. For instance, if agent j gets at least as much trust from each other agent as agent
k does (so that Tij ≥ Tik for all i), then j has at least as much inﬂuence as k (so that
sj ≥ sk). Similarly, holding else is equal, it is better to obtain trust from an agent who
has more inﬂuence. That is, If Tij = Tik for all i 6= `,m and T`j = Tmk > T`k = Tmj, then
s` > sm implies sj > sk.
To move beyond these observations, we need to derive how s changes as T changes.
For instance, suppose that a particular agent redistributes his or her trust. That is, he or
she trusts one acquaintance more and another acquaintance less – the latter being necessary
because the weights any given agent assigns to his or her contacts must sum to 1. Intuitively,
18one might guess that the inﬂuence of the agent to whom more trust has just been allocated
would increase, but this is not entirely obvious, especially as there are many indirect eﬀects.
Nevertheless, a corollary of the main result of this section is that, the intuitive prediction is
correct.
First, we build on a result of Schweitzer (1968) to give two characterizations of how
changes in trust aﬀect inﬂuence weights, and then we deduce the proposition claimed above.
We consider general perturbations of the interaction matrix – i.e., changing T to T + δC,
where C is arbitrary subject to the condition that the resulting matrix still be stochastic.
This requires that each row of C sum to 0.
Theorem 6. For any strongly connected, convergent T, suppose that C is a matrix whose
rows each sum to 0. Let
˜ T(δ) = T + δC,
and let ˜ s(δ) be the vector of inﬂuence weights corresponding to ˜ T(δ), supposing that ˜ T(δ) is
nonnegative for small enough δ. Then
˜ s
0(0) = sC(I − T + es)
−1 ,







and the series converges.
This comparative static is still somewhat abstract, but easy to compute once the pertur-
bation of the interaction matrix is known, especially using the inﬁnite series above, which
we have not seen elsewhere13. We obtain two interpretable corollaries by considering speciﬁc
perturbations.
Now we can characterize changes in inﬂuence upon perturbation of T using indirect
inﬂuences, and explicitly give the signs of certain inﬂuence changes. Deﬁne the t-step weight
of i on j as the (i,j) entry of Tt, which we write as T
(t)
ij .
Corollary 1. Consider any strongly connected, convergent T. If Cij = 1; Cik = −1; and
13The series expression is particularly attractive because for networks with second eigenvalues that are
not too large, it converges very quickly, so it is only necessary to compute a few terms.
19C has 0 entries elsewhere, then ˜ s0
j(0) ≥ 0 and ˜ s0































Corollary 2. Retain the assumptions of the previous corollary. If Cij > 0; Cik ≤ 0 for all
all k 6= j; and 0 elsewhere, then ˜ s0
j(0) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst corollary says that if agent i redistributes his or her trust, placing more weight
on the opinion of agent j and correspondingly less on that of agent k, then agent j becomes
weakly more inﬂuential and agent k becomes weakly less inﬂuential in the network. The
second corollary says that agent j becomes more inﬂuential even if the new weight he or she
receives is taken from several agents, not just one.
Moreover, Corollary 1 shows that, quite generally, it is better to be trusted more by a
more inﬂuential agent. That is, the improvement in one’s inﬂuence arising from a favorable
redistribution of trust by some agent is directly proportional to the inﬂuence of the agent
redistributing it. This holds regardless of the structure of T, and generalizes our observation
at the start of this section.
6 Dynamics: How Long Does Disagreement Last?
While Theorem 3 pins down the limiting behavior of beliefs, it does not illuminate the
question of how long convergence takes or how this depends on the speciﬁcs of the belief
matrix. Since disagreement is often observed in practice, there may be networks in which
convergence takes a a very long time.
As in DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003), in this section, we develop variations on re-
sults from spectral theory that relate rates of convergence to the size of eigenvalues. Beyond
that, we then relate the bounds on convergence rates to the structure of the interaction. Ap-
plying a theorem on second eigenvalues, we can conclude that slow convergence corresponds
to the case where society is factious – divided into several mutually distrustful components.
There is also a useful suﬃcient condition for agreement to happen quickly.
The contribution in this section is not to present new mathematical results, as the results
here easily follow from existing results from various literatures; but rather to collect and
20adapt the results to the current setting.
The ﬁrst proposition, which is a standard Markov chain convergence result, gives an
upper bound on the diﬀerence between the current belief vector and the limiting one, thus
describing a condition under which convergence is fast. A proof can be found in Seneta
(1973, p. 7).
Proposition 4. Fix any norm k·k on Rn. Let T be strongly connected and aperiodic, and
let λ(T) be the second-largest eigenvalue, in magnitude, of T. Then |λ2(T)| < 1 and there
exist positive real constants C and K (which depend only on the matrix T) such that for
each i ∈ A:
|pi(∞) − pi(t)| ≤ Ct
K |λ2(T)|
t · kp(0)k. (3)
Note that the exponential decay of |λ2(T)|
t overpowers the polynomial growth of tK, so
the system converges, as we already know. This proposition says that when |λ2(T)| is small,
the system is guaranteed to converge quickly to its steady state.
Reversing the inequality is not possible in general. However, a companion proposition,
whose proof can be found in Karlin and Taylor (1975, p. 542–551), gives a partial converse.
Proposition 5. Retain the assumptions of Proposition 4. There exists an initial vector
p(0) ∈ Rn, a positive real constant C, and an agent i ∈ A, such that
|pi(∞) − pi(t)| ≥ C |λ2(T)|
t . (4)
This proposition says that if |λ2(T)| is large – i.e., close to 1 – then for some initial
belief vectors, the system will converge to its steady state quite slowly. It is clear that this
statement can only hold for some initial belief vectors, as one can always start agents out
with identical beliefs in which case convergence is instantaneous.
The two propositions taken together allow us to use |λ2(T)| as a proxy for the system’s
tendency to equilibrate. If |λ2(T)| is small, then all the agents quickly reach agreement. If
|λ2(T)| is large, then convergence can take a long time. Note that if some agents are to one
side of the limiting belief, then some others must clearly be on the other side – otherwise,
a process of averaging could never arrive at the limiting belief. Thus, while the eventual
beliefs will always coincide, this might take happen slowly enough that diversity of opinion
is observed for a long time, even in strongly connected networks.
While useful, these results leave something to be desired. In particular, the second largest
eigenvalue of the interaction matrix is a rather abstract invariant of the system. What does
it mean, in more concrete terms, for the interaction matrix to have a small or large second
eigenvalue?
21In fact, we can give an explicit necessary and suﬃcient condition for convergence to take
a long time. To this end, we provide a few deﬁnitions.




(TB,A−B + TC,A−C). (5)
The minimum is taken over all pairs of disjoint subsets of agents such that neither subset
is empty. Let T be rearranged (by permuting the labeling of the agents) so that the above












where T11 is a k1-by-k1 matrix and T22 is has dimensions (k2 − k1)-by-(k2 − k1). We can
think of σ(T) as the sum of the entries in T12,T13,T21, and T23. The cohesion σ(T) being
small corresponds to each agent in B0 and C0 having very little weight on those outside his
or her group.
The cohesion measure of a stochastic matrix is closely related to the second largest
eigenvalue, which is a result due to Hartﬁel and Meyer (1998). A slight variation of their
result is the following theorem which leads to implications for speed of convergence from our
perspective.
Theorem 7. [Hartﬁel and Meyer (1998)] Consider a stochastic, strongly connected matrix
T. Having a low cohesion implies having a large second eigenvalue in the sense that for any
ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 so that σ(T) < δ implies |λ2(T) − 1| < ε. Conversely, having a
large second eigenvalue implies a low cohesion in the following sense: for any ε > 0, there
exists a δ > 0 such that |λ2(T) − 1| < δ implies σ(T) < ε.
As claimed earlier, Theorem 7, together with Propositions 4 and 5, imply that conver-
gence of beliefs is slow if there are at least two distrustful factions – groups who have little
trust for those outside them, and in particular for each other. Conversely, if convergence is
suﬃciently slow, then it must be possible to partition society in this way.
14Hartﬁel and Meyer (1998) call this quantity the uncoupling measure. In this terminology, systems with
low uncoupling measures are very uncoupled. We have chosen the alternative term cohesion as it seems more
descriptive.
22Corollary 3. For any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that such that if T is strongly
connected and aperiodic with cohesion less than δ then we can ﬁnd a an initial vector p(0) ∈
Rn, an agent i ∈ A, and a C ∈ R such that
|pi(∞) − pi(t)| ≥ C(1 − ε)
t. (7)
While Corollary 3 provides conditions for convergence to be slow, we might also be
interested in suﬃcient conditions for fast convergence. Here, general conditions seem to be
harder to ﬁnd, especially since fast convergence is required for all initial beliefs. Nevertheless,
there are some situations where we can deduce conditions that ensure fast convergence.
The following proposition builds on results about expander graphs (e.g., see Hoory, Linial,
and Wigderson (2006)). Consider a T which is d-regular and symmetric: that is, such that
there exists d ≥ 1 such that each i has Tij = 1
d for d agents j 6= i, and where Tij = Tji. The






This keeps track of how many agents outside of B are trusted by the agents inside of B
relative to B’s size, and then ﬁnds the smallest ratio of this rate of “expansion”. It is
clear that h lies between 0 and 1. Theorems on expander graphs relate this ratio to second
eigenvalues. Building from that theory, we can prove the following:
Proposition 6. If T is strongly connected, d-regular, and symmetric, then there exist pos-
itive real constants C and K (which depend only on the matrix T) such that for each i ∈ A:









This is derived directly from Proposition 4 and the fact that λ2(T) ≤ 1 −
(h(T))2
2 (see
Theorem 2.4 in Hoory, Linial, and Wigderson (2006)).15 The proposition implies that if
groups of agents are looking suﬃciently outwards to sets of other agents, then convergence
of beliefs is fast. For instance, if each set of agents B placed high enough weight on BC so




We also mention a convenient suﬃcient condition for convergence to be fast, which is due
15The deﬁnition of h is adjusted here for the stochastic nature of the matrix, and the bound on the
eigenvalue is adjusted accordingly.
23to Haveliwala and Kavmar (2006).
Consider a case where T can be decomposed as follows:
T = uU + (1 − u)H, (10)
where u ∈ [0,1]; U is a stochastic matrix such that all the entries in any given column are
equal; and H is any stochastic matrix. The matrix U is the uniform component of T and the
matrix H the heterogeneous component of T. Deﬁne the uniformity of T as the largest u such
that the decomposition in (10) is possible.16 We say that U is uniform because, for each j, all
entries in column j of U are equal, say to U∗j. This corresponds to all agents trusting agent
j at least uU∗j. Since U is stochastic, it follows that everyone shares a baseline distribution
of trust across some agents; the uniform component of each agent’s trust distribution adds
up to u.
Haveliwala and Kavmar (2006) show that if T is a stochastic matrix that is decomposed as
in (10), Then |λ2(T)| ≤ 1−u. Thus, if the uniformity of T is high enough, then convergence is
guaranteed to be fast. Intuitively, uniformity is high when a signiﬁcant portion of everyone’s
information comes from a common set of agents. For example, it is high if everyone has a
signiﬁcant degree of trust for some set of media organizations. In terms of cohesion, we can
see that having uniformity above some level then leads to a cohesion above some level. So
intuitively, one expects faster convergence. However, the results on cohesion only hold as
cohesion approaches 0, and so the uniformity results of Haveliwala and Kavmar (2006) show
that, at least in some special cases, the results extend beyond the limiting extremes.
7 Conclusion
There are several testable empirical implications to be drawn from the results presented here.
First, the results on necessary and suﬃcient conditions for convergence to common beliefs
suggest that the topological details of network structure can have a large qualitative impact:
they determine whether the agents ever come to agree. In particular, if the network is regular
in the sense of all cycle lengths having a common factor, then beliefs may cycle indeﬁnitely.
This is in contrast with previous results on learning in networks, in which the precise small-
scale topological structure of the network does not typically play such a key role. On the
other hand, the result is generally an optimistic one for long-term convergence: networks
for which convergence fails are quite special, and many networks arising from stochastic
16The fact that the set of possible values of u is compact proves that this maximum exists.
24processes would satisfy the suﬃcient conditions for convergence.
The main topic of this paper, explored in Section 4, concerns whether large societies
whose agents get noisy estimates of the truth converge to true beliefs. We show that they
do under certain assumptions about social structure. The ﬂavor of the main condition is
that no group of agents (unless it is large) should get very much more trust than it gives
back. As long as this holds, and one of several additional conditions regarding dispersion is
satisﬁed, it follows that suﬃciently large societies will come arbitrarily close to the truth.
These results suggest two insights. First, excessive attention to small groups of pundits or
opinion-makers who are not reciprocally attentive to group opinion is bad for convergence
to truth. On the other hand, social cohesion – in the sense of not having segments of society
that essentially ignore each other’s views – is good.
In our context, these conclusions provide an answer to a broad question asked by Joel
Sobel (2000): can large societies whose agents are fairly na¨ ıve individually be smart in the
aggregate? In this model, they can, if there is enough dispersion in who they listen to, and if
they avoid concentrating too much on any small group of agents.17 This conclusion contrasts
with the very special conditions required for na¨ ıve learning presented by DeMarzo, Vayanos
and Zwiebel (2003). In this sense, there seems to be more hope for boundedly rational social
learning than has previously been believed. On the other hand, our suﬃcient conditions are
fairly strong in the sense that they can fail if there is just one group which receives too much
trust or is too insular. This raises a natural question: which processes of network formation
satisfy the suﬃcient conditions we have set forth? How must agents dynamically allocate
trust to ensure that no group obtains an excessive share of inﬂuence in the long run? These
are potential directions for future work.
Our results on comparative statics show that when agents redistribute their trust, per-
turbations in the global social inﬂuences can readily be computed if we understand agents’
indirect weights on each other’s opinions. Importantly, sometimes only a few levels of indi-
rect weights are required to get a very good approximation to the true perturbation. Thus,
these results provide a means of testing the theory with only local information about details
of the network structure.
The results that we surveyed regarding convergence rates provide some insight into po-
larization and propaganda. We should expect long-term polarization on an issue when the
social structure describing how people discuss that issue splits into several mutually dis-
trustful groups. This would mean that an agent’s discussion partners are mostly restricted
17This is similar to the discussion in Bala and Goyal (1998) of what can go wrong when there is a commonly
observed “royal family” under a diﬀerent model of observational learning.
25to the group in which he or she is located, and that there is little trust across party lines.
Such properties have been studied in the political science literature: see, e.g., Huckfeldt and
Sprague (1987). In contrast to the slow convergence of an incohesive society, elimination
by authoritarian regimes of all but a few oﬃcial media outlets leads to greater cohesion.
Consider Pravda in the former Soviet Union, or the blocking of many foreign news sources
in China, etc. One obvious reason for this behavior is to control access to information. This
also increases the inﬂuence of those news sources, as well as helping in terms of a rate of
convergence.
To ﬁnish, we mention some obvious extensions of the project. First, the theory can be
applied to a variety of strategic situations in which social networks play a role. For instance,
consider an election in which two political candidates are trying to convince voters. While
the voters remain nonstrategic about their communications, the politicians (who may be
viewed as being outside the network) can be quite strategic about how they attempt to
shape beliefs. A salient question is whom the candidates would choose to target. The social
network would clearly be an important ingredient. A related application would consider
ﬁrms competitively selling similar products (such as Coke and Pepsi).18 Here, there would
be some beneﬁts to one ﬁrm of the other ﬁrms’ advertising. These complementarities, along
with the complexity added by the social network, would make for an interesting study of
marketing. Second, it would be interesting to involve heterogeneous agents in the network.
In this paper, we have focused on nonstrategic agents who are all boundedly rational in
essentially the same way. We might consider how the theory changes if there are some fully
rational agents in the network. Can a small mixture of diﬀerent agents signiﬁcantly change
the group’s behavior? Such extensions would be a step toward connecting fully rational and
boundedly rational models, and would open the door to a more robust understanding of
social learning.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 2. If T is strongly connected and aperiodic, then it is primitive (i.e., Tk > 0 for
some ﬁnite k).
Lemma 2 is a standard corollary to the Perron-Frobenius Theorem (see, e.g., Horn and
Johnson (1985, Theorem 8.5.3)).
18See Galeotti and Goyal (2007) for a one-ﬁrm model of optimal advertising on a network.
26Lemma 3. [The Stochastic Matrix Theorem] If T is stochastic and primitive, then it con-
verges.
A proof can be found in Meyer (2000, Section 8.3).
Lemma 4. If T is strongly connected, stochastic and not aperiodic, then it does not converge.
Proof of Lemma 4: First we introduce some notation. Denote the length of a walk or
cycle B by |B|. Suppose B = i1,i2,...,ib and C = j1,j2,...,jc are walks such that ib = j1.
Then deﬁne B +C, called the concatenation of B and C, as i1,i2 ...,ib,j2,...,jc. It is easy
to check that when two walks are concatenated, the length of the resulting walk is the sum
of the lengths of its constituents. That is, |B +C| = |B|+|C|, and the same is also true for
cycles.
Choose any node i. As T is strongly connected, i is on at least one cycle. Since T is not
aperiodic, there is an integer d > 1 such that any cycle D containing i has length divisible
by d.
Let Y be the set of all nodes j such that some path from i to j has length divisible by d.
Claim: If j ∈ Y then all walks from i to j have length divisible by d.
Proof of Claim: Suppose j ∈ Y . Let B be a walk from i to j whose length is divisible by
d. Let B0 be another walk from i to j. We will show that the length of B0 is divisible by d.
By strong connectedness, there is a walk E from j to i. Since B + E is a cycle through i, it
follows that d divides |B +E| = |B|+|E|. The fact that d divides |B| implies that d divides
|E|. But B0 +E is another cycle through i, so d divides |B0 +E| = |B0|+|E|. Since we saw
d divides the second summand and the left hand side, it must divide |B0|, as desired. This
shows the claim.





0 if j ∈ Y





We claim pi(t) = 0 whenever d | t and pi(t) = 1 whenever d - t.















The coeﬃcient of pj(0) is nonzero if and only if there is a walk from i to j of length t. This
happens if and only if j ∈ Y , by deﬁnition of Y . But pj(0) = 0 whenever j ∈ Y . This shows
pi(t) = 0.








The coeﬃcient of pj(0) is nonzero if and only if there is a walk from i to j of length t. By







This is the sum of the ith row of R = Tt, and this matrix is still stochastic, so pi(t) = 1.
The theorem follows directly from these lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 2 and 3:
The backward implication of Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 4 after observing that if T
is not strongly aperiodic, then some minimal closed group of T must fail to be aperiodic.
The backward implication of Theorem 3 is immediate.
We will prove the forward implication of Theorem 2 and also Theorem 3 at the same
time, via the following standard lemma.
Lemma 5. If T is strongly connected and aperiodic, then there is a row vector s > 0 such




This vector is the left eigenvector of T corresponding to the eigenvalue 1. In particular, all
entries of the limit are the same.
28Proof of Lemma 5: Standard facts about Markov matrices, which can be found in Meyer
(2000, Section 8.3) and Berman and Plemmons (1979, Chapter 2) imply the following facts,
which we collect here for later reference. The spectral radius of the matrix T, denoted ρ(T),
is 1 as T is stochastic. In fact, 1 is the unique eigenvalue of T with magnitude 1, and
all other eigenvalues are strictly smaller in magnitude. By Meyer (2000, Section 8.3), the









where e is the column vector of ones and s is the unique, positive left-hand Perron (row)
eigenvector of T corresponding to eigenvalue 1. We may scale s so that its entries sum to 1.
Since the right side of the above limit equation is e times a 1-by-1 matrix, it follows that
all the entries in the limiting vector are the same, namely sp. This proves all the claims in
the lemma.
This proves the theorem for a strongly connected interaction matrix. Now suppose that
the matrix is not strongly connected, so that some proper subset of agents is not closed.







where the bottom right block corresponds to all agents in M, i.e. all agents in any minimal
closed group, and the rows above it correspond to agents who are in no minimal closed group.











where each Bk is minimally closed. Each will also be aperiodic, because T is strongly




BkpBk = sBkpBk, (13)
where sBk is the unique left eigenvector of TBk, scaled so that its entries sum to 1. Deﬁne
s = 0 ⊕ sB1 ⊕···⊕ sBm, where 0 is a zero row vector such that s ∈ Rn. This shows (1–3) of
Theorem 3.
For the remaining parts of Theorem 3, we note by Meyer (2000, Section 8.4) that the




















The block-diagonal form of E, along with (13), immediately implies (4) of Theorem 3.
Since powers of stochastic matrices are stochastic, Z has rows summing to 1. For each




















































by deﬁnition of q and wj. This completes the proof of (5) in Theorem 3. The forward
direction of Theorem 2 follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We know that the variance of each φn









1 → 0. Since si
n ≥ sn

















30By Chebychev’s inequality, ﬁxing any ε > 0
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For the converse, suppose (taking a subsequence if neccesary) sn
1 → s > 0. Since each
Xn has support in [−M,M], a variance bounded below, and mean µ, it then follows that
there exists δ > 0 such that Var(Xn) > δ for all n. But this implies directly that there exists
ε and x > 0 such that, for each n,
P












This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: First we prove that if the condition sn
1 → 0 holds, then con-
vergence to truth occurs. By Theorem 3, agents with no inﬂuence converge to weighted
averages of beliefs of agents with inﬂuence, so it suﬃces to show that if in ∈ An is any
sequence of agents in minimal closed groups, then plimn→∞ pn
in(∞) = µ. Let Bn be the
minimal closed group of in. Without loss of generality, we may replace Tn with induced
interaction matrix on the agents in Bn. Now, by the lemma, all that is required for every
agent in Bn to converge to true beliefs is that |Bn| → ∞ and the most inﬂuential agent in Bn
have inﬂuence converging to 0. The second fact follows because the most inﬂuential agent
in An has inﬂuence converging to 0, and a fortiori the same must hold for the leader in Bn.
The ﬁrst fact follows directly from this, for the inﬂuences of agents in Bn now converge to 0
but sum to 1, which is impossible if the number of agents is bounded by a ﬁnite number.
Conversely, if the inﬂuence of some agent remains bounded above 0, then we may restrict
attention to his closed group and conclude from the argument of the lemma that convergence
to truth is not generally guaranteed.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Recall that we have ordered the agents so that sn
i ≥ sn
i+1 for all i. In the proof of this
theorem and the next, all unadorned limits are taken as n → ∞. Suppose to the contrary
that there is a subsequence where sn
1 → s > 0.
Take the subsequence to be the sequence.
Let kn be a sequence such that limknsn
kn → 0 and kn ≤ n/2. To see that such a sequence
exists, consider a countable sequence of x → 0. Let us ﬁrst argue that for each x there is
31at most a ﬁnite set of set of n, such that isn
i ≥ x for all i ≤ n/2. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists x > 0 such that for an inﬁnite set of n, isn








i → ∞, which is a contradiction. Thus, for each x there is
nx such that for every n > nx, the set Cx,n = {i : isn
i < x} is nonempty. The nx form a
nondecreasing sequence as x → 0. Select the sequence kn by choosing from Cx0,n where x0 is
the largest x such that nx ≤ n.
For each n, let Hn = {1,...,kn} and Ln = An −Hn. Observe that since sn is a left hand
















































































































Taking Bn = {1,...,q} and Cn = An−Bn in the statement of the minimal out-dispersion







for a natural number q and a positive real r.
Also, sn
L ≤ sn












Hn,Ln is bounded (by balance), this implies that limn sn
q = 0.
So, consider a case where limsn
q = 0. Let k be the largest i such that limn sn
i = 0. Let



















































The left side will have supremum ∞ over all n because sn
k+1 → 0 while sn
k has posi-
tive limsup. The right side, however, is bounded using the balance property. This is a
contradiction, and therefore this case is complete.





1 = 0 (19)
Suppose otherwise.
We proceed by cases. First, assume that there are only ﬁnitely many i such that
limn→∞ sn
i > 0. Then we can proceed as at the end of the proof of Theorem 4 to reach
a contradiction. Note that only balance for ﬁnite groups is needed, which is implied by
balance for small groups.
From now on, we may assume that there are inﬁnitely many i such that limn→∞ sn
i > 0.
In particular, if we take the q guaranteed by Property 4 and set Bn = {1,2,...,q}, then
we know that limn→∞ sn
i > 0 for each i ∈ Bn. Now, ﬁx a function g : N → N and deﬁne
Cn = {q + 1,...,q + g(n)}. Finally, put Dn = {q + g(n) + 1,q + g(n) + 2,...,n}.





and limg(n) = ∞, i.e. g is a divergent function. Let Ck
n = {q + 1,q + 2,...,q + k − 1}. By











g(n) = max{k : nk ≤ n}.
Since n1,n2,... is an increasing sequence of integers, the set whose maximum is being taken
is ﬁnite. It is also nonempty for n ≥ n1, so g is well deﬁned there. For n < n1, let g(n) = 1.
Next, observe limg(n) = ∞. For if not, there is some k0 so that nk ≤ nk0 for all k, which is














This shows our claim about the choice of g.











































































































































Using the ordering of the sn























































































By the ordering of the sn






























To ﬁnish the proof, we need two observations. The ﬁrst is that sn
f(n) → 0. Suppose not,














The second observation is that we may, without loss of generality, assume g is a divergent
function satisfying limn→∞
g(n)
n = 0, so that (Cn)∞
n=1 is small. For if we have a g so that this
condition does not hold, it is easy to verify that reducing g to some smaller divergent function
35for which the condition does hold cannot destroy the property in (20).












By an argument very similar to the previous case, the observations we have just derived
along with Property 3 generate the needed contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 6 The equation
˜ s
0(0) = sC(I − T + es)
−1
is a well-known result of Schweitzer (1968, equation 15). Multiplying both sides of it on the
right by (I − T + es), one obtains
˜ s
0(0)(I − T + es) = sC.
However, the entries of ˜ s0(0) sum to zero, while all the rows of es are the same, so the
corresponding product vanishes and
˜ s
0(0) = ˜ s
0(0)T + sC.
Replacing ˜ s0(0) on the right hand side with the entire right hand side repeatedly, we ﬁnd,
for all r ≥ 1
˜ s







Taking the limit as r → ∞, the ﬁrst term on the right vanishes by the argument we just
gave, because Tr+1 → es. The summation on the right converges because the left hand side
is a well-deﬁned vector by the ﬁrst part of the proof. This establishes (2).
Proof of Corollary 1 The summation formulas follow immediately from (2). To establish








We will show v
(δ)
j > 0 and v
(δ)
k < 0 for each such δ. Additionally, we will check that we can
interchange the limit as δ → 1 from below with the above summation. Using the summation
36expression for the derivative from (2), this will prove the corollary.
















The terms on the right hand side are those of an absolutely convergent series, as follows. By













where q = |λ2(T)| < 1 and α,K are constants. Now sCes = 0 since all rows of es are equal,











where α0 is another constant, since eventually pt > tKqt. But the series on the right hand side
is geometric with ratio less than 1, so it converges. Combining these facts, (26) converges as
claimed and (25) is established.
Now, we will show that ˜ s0
j(0) ≥ 0 and ˜ s0
k(0) ≤ 0. By the above claim about interchanging
sums and limits, it suﬃces to see v
(δ)
j > 0 and v
(δ)
k < 0 for each δ ∈ (1
2,1). To this end,
observe that the series deﬁning v(δ) is absolutely convergent, so we may rearrange the order







Now δT has spectral radius δ < 1, so the Neumann series guarantees
v
(δ) = sC(I − δT)
−1 . (27)
Write X = I−δT and Y = X−1. It is easy to see that for each i, we have Xii >
P
j6=i |Xij|.
Then Fiedler and Pt´ ak (1967, Theorem 3.5) guarantees that for each j and for each i 6= j,
|Yjj| > |Yij|. Moreover, by Berman and Plemmons (1979, Lemma 2.1), Y has only positive
37entries, so in fact Yjj > Yij > 0. In (27), note that sC has si in column j, has −si in column
k, and has 0 elsewhere. This combined with the facts about Y now establishes the claim




k , by inspection of (27).
Proof of Corollary 2 The proof proceeds exactly as in the previous corollary, except in
this case, sC has Cijsi in column j while the rest of its columns are nonpositive numbers
summing to −Cijsi. Then once again inspection of (27) along with the facts derived above
about Y complete the proof.
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